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Professor Siegan maintained that the Constitution protects economic
liberty, which he described as “the right to produce and distribute goods
and services.”1 As is so often the case with the Constitution, the interesting
question is not whether it pursues some desirable goal, but how it does
so, and how much. I will suggest that the Constitution as drafted does
indeed take many steps to ensure that the people will be able to produce
and distribute goods and services in a relatively free market based on
private property and freedom of contract. It does so, however, the way it
pursues most of its ultimate goals, indirectly. The Constitution provides

* D. Lurton Massee, Jr., Professor of Law and Horace and Grace L. Doherty
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1. BERNARD H. SIEGAN, THE SUPREME COURT’S CONSTITUTION 41 (1987).
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for the common defense, not by saying that there shall be a common
defense, but through a series of much more concrete steps ranging from
Congress’s power to raise and support armies to limitations on the
states’ capacity to do so, and thereby embroil the rest of the country in
war.2 It establishes justice, not by stating that there shall be justice, but
through a series of provisions that deal with the courts and judicial
matters.3 And it pursues its first goal of all, to form a more perfect
Union, not by saying that there shall be one, but by forming a more
perfect Union.4 That is how the Constitution protects economic liberties.
Section I of this paper presents a positive account of the Constitution
based on descriptive claims that I hope are relatively uncontroversial. It
is positive in this sense: it provides an explanation of the Constitution in
terms of the purposes that would have led reasonable drafters to produce
it. As the topic of this symposium is the constitutional protection of
economic liberty, I ask how a reasonable group of drafters, at the time
the Constitution’s provisions were written, could have adopted those
provisions in order to foster a free economy. That produces an account
of how the Constitution was designed to ensure economic freedom. The
dominating theme is that the Constitution does so without taking the
most obvious and direct step in that direction, which would be to provide
the basic private rights that together constitute economic liberty. Instead, at
a number of important points, the Constitution takes those rights for
granted, as already existing under state law, and reinforces them without
simply determining their content.
Section II is interpretive, making claims about the meaning of the
Constitution. It takes issue with Professor Siegan, arguing that the
Constitution gives economic interests hardly any protection in the form
that we associate with guarantees of individuals rights. This section
defends the position that the Constitution does not itself provide the
legal rules that establish private rights to property and contract, nor does
it strongly constrain what the states and Congress may do when they
create, change, and regulate those rights. Section II focuses mainly on
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in
which Professor Siegan found powerful constitutional safeguards for
economic freedom, and maintains that the Clause operates indirectly, by
requiring equality among citizens, and not directly on the substance of
state private law.5

2.
3.
4.
5.
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Section III is historical and normative. It uses the country’s history
under the Constitution to approach the question whether it would be
desirable for the Constitution to protect economic liberty more directly,
or, if one agrees with Professor Siegan, whether it is desirable for the
Constitution to protect economic liberty in the direct manner it does. I
give some reasons to believe that it would not be.
I. THE CONSTITUTION’S INDIRECT APPROACH TO ECONOMIC LIBERTY
A. Federal and State Power and a Free Economy
By economic liberty, I mean a legal system in which decisions about
production and consumption are made by private individuals, not collectively
through government. In order for individuals to make economic decisions,
they must have control over resources and be able to make agreements
concerning those resources and their activities, which means that the
government must protect private property and enable people to bind
themselves through contracts. Property and contract are, in a manner of
speaking, forms of public power. Economic liberty exists when other
forms of public power, which would transfer operational control from
private people to the state, are limited.
In order to decide whether there is economic liberty, and what the
Constitution does about it, it is thus necessary to consider both the
foundational private legal advantages of property and contract and the
powers of government to impose additional controls. Under the American
Constitution, the first question concerning economic freedom involves
the allocation of those powers between the states and the national
government.
Federalism, the Constitution’s fundamental feature, has several facets.
Probably the most familiar to students of constitutional law is the
principle of enumerated federal power: the national government is not
omnicompetent, but rather has only the particular powers granted to it.6
Next most familiar is the political autonomy of the states. State
governments are not regional departments of the national government.7
They have their own constitutional powers derived directly from popular

6. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
7. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that
Congress may not require that state officers execute federal law).
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sovereignty, and the power of the national government to regulate them
as such is quite limited.
Less familiar, though as important as the air we breathe, is the
converse of enumerated federal power and a complement to the political
autonomy of the states. Each state is a complete political and legal
system, at least as to internal matters, and is not dependent on a higher
level of government.8 That principle, combined with the limited grants
of national power, means that the legal foundations of economic
freedom are found in state law. State law, not federal law, creates the
legal rules that provide basic rights of property and contract and
protections thereof, for example through the law of torts.9 To know how
an individual acquires property in Virginia and makes arrangements
about it with other individuals, one looks to the law of Virginia, not the
United States. Moreover, the states have substantial power to regulate
private economic transactions. That arrangement is secured by the Federal
Constitution through the limited ability of the national government to
legislate on those topics and its very limited ability to command the
states in their legislation.
That structure protects economic liberty, in the sense in which I am
interested, if reasonable Constitution drafters could have adopted it for
that purpose. I believe that they could have and indeed to a substantial
extent did.
It is tempting to think that the reason most questions concerning
economic rights were left to the states by the Constitution’s drafters is
simply that the states already existed as complete legal systems and
consolidation was not on the agenda. No one took seriously the possibility
of simply replacing the states with a single government that would,
among other things, prescribe the basic rules of private ownership and
8. The people of the United States constitute one nation, under one government,
and this government, within the scope of the powers with which it is invested,
is supreme. On the other hand, the people of each State compose a State,
having its own government, and endowed with all the functions essential to
separate and independent existence. The States disunited might continue to
exist. Without the States in union there could be no such political body as the
United States.
Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 71, 76 (1869).
Nowhere is the theory and practice of American federalism more significantly
revealed than in the constitutions of the states. These constitutions assume
responsibility for dealing, and claim authority to deal, with the whole gamut of
problems cast up out of the flux of everyday life in the state, save only in the
particular respects in which the Federal Constitution or statutes deprive the
states of any competence whatever or provide for an overriding or displacing
federal law.
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
489, 491 (1954).
9. Hart, supra note 8, at 491.
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trade. But there are reasons consolidation was not considered—reasons
that justify the Framers’ decision—that I will sketch presently.
It is also tempting to think that, in any event, the structure I have
described, however it came to be adopted, simply cannot qualify as
constitutional protection of economic rights. Today, it is natural to think
that constitutional protection of any right simply means that the United
States Constitution contains a provision, enforced by the judiciary and
ultimately interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States, that
limits the governmental power of the national or state governments, or
both. That is certainly the kind of constitutional protection of rights that
is most discussed by contemporary scholars of constitutional law, but
here as elsewhere, synecdoche is a trope and not a literal description; the
part with which we are most familiar is not the whole. If a constitutional
arrangement significantly increases the likelihood that certain legal
advantages will be available, it protects them.
At the time of the framing, as today, the states were democracies with
their own constitutions and their own legal systems based on the common
law but with adaptations to local conditions. Those legal systems secured
private rights of property and contract. Those constitutions established
and secured democracy. The greater political entity that the states in
union form, the United States, is also a constitutional democracy with a
legal system that rests on private property and contract—because it is
composed of the legal systems of the states. The justification of the
Constitution’s arrangement, with respect to the security of economic
freedom, thus must be found in an argument in favor of decentralization
on these topics.
That argument is straightforward and has been well known to Americans
from the founding until today. Conditions, especially economic conditions,
vary from state to state, and legal arrangements should vary with them.
It is commonplace that legal arrangements governing water ownership
and use should vary with topography, differing from the rainy East to the
arid West.10 A part of the country with much manufacturing might find
it worthwhile to replace its tort system with one of workers’ compensation
for industrial accidents, while another that is primarily agricultural might
find the additional administrative burden not worth the trouble. It is true
10. A classic statement of the common law principle of riparian rights is found in
Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 Fed. Cas. 472, 474 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312). Western
states generally follow the principle of prior appropriation. TARLOCK, CORBRIDGE, &
GETCHES, WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 149 (4th ed. 1993).
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that a single government can adopt varying rules from one region to
another, but in doing so, it must process more information, and deal with
more constituencies, than a lower level of government.11
While the Constitution’s structure mainly leaves the question of
private rights to the states, it does take one crucial step that grants some
authority to a higher level government, one designed to produce a
carefully calculated form of integration of the disparate parts of this
Union. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV ensures that
citizens of every state may do business in every other state and enjoy the
same civil rights of property and contract that the state’s own citizens
enjoy.12 This Clause licenses variety while leveraging the ability of
democracies to make law that is congenial to those who will live under
it. And it deals with the pathology of discrimination against inadequately
represented outsiders by giving those outsiders the benefits that the
insiders have devised for themselves. In a stroke, it produces many of
the advantages of a uniform national private law without adopting one or
empowering the national legislature to do so.13
So far, I have stressed the states’ side of federalism, emphasizing the
argument in favor of leaving them to make most of the law that produces
a free economy. The other key component of federalism is the limited
empowerment of the national government. A few rules of property and
contract are to be made by the national legislature, and these exceptions
show the design underlying the rule. Congress has power to create two
11. Students of the American constitutional system will immediately respond to
this argument in favor of decentralization by thinking of THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James
Madison), and Madison’s famous argument that a territorially larger government will
more fully secure private rights than will a smaller, less extended polity. THE
FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). Those who believe Madison should rest easy, and
perhaps think that the Framers who rejected his scheme for a national veto were
foresighted. Madison’s argument is about pure, not relative, scale. He maintained that a
larger country would have more contending factions to counteract one another, and more
individuals of virtue to manage them, than would a smaller country. Madison believed,
or at least had to claim, that this country in 1787 was large enough to accomplish his
goal. The United States in that year had less than half the population of the City of New
York today. Even small governmental units have long since become large enough to
satisfy his requirements.
12. Article IV provides that “[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2,
cl. 1. “Derived, like the Commerce Clause, from the fourth of the Articles of
Confederation, the Privileges and Immunities Clause was intended to create a national
economic union. It is therefore not surprising that this Court repeatedly has found that
‘one of the privileges which the Clause guarantees to citizens of State A is that of doing
business in State B on terms of substantial equality with the citizens of that State.’”
Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 279–80 (1985) (citation omitted).
13. Of course, this approach does not achieve all the advantages of uniformity.
But it makes possible the advantages of non-uniformity, while leaving the states free to
obtain the benefits of pure coordination voluntarily, as they have often done.
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specified forms of intellectual property: patents and copyrights.14 The
Constitution thereby enlists a national market to provide incentives for
art and invention while avoiding the difficulties and possibilities for
local exploitation that would arise were every work of art to need a
copyright, or every invention a patent, in every state. Without such national
power, Rhode Island could become a haven for infringers without
violating its obligations under the Privileges and Immunities Clause,
allowing citizens and noncitizens alike to publish pirated works and
duplicate patented devices. Even without bad behavior, authors and
inventors would be deterred by the prospect of complying with the laws
of each state separately.
Congress also has some authority with respect to contract law—and
economic affairs more broadly—authority that once again illuminates
the many areas in which Congress has none. The commerce power
extends to commercial relations that cross lines of sovereignty, be they
those of a state, of the United States, or of the quasi-sovereign Indian
tribes—some of which were more than just quasi-sovereign when the
Constitution was adopted.15 It enables Congress to provide uniform
rules of commercial law—though exactly how far it reaches in that
respect is unclear—but the commerce power’s more important function
is to eliminate a collective action problem that the states otherwise
would have. Left to their own devices, they would be tempted to impose
restrictions on importation and exportation, and possibly on businesses
conducting such commerce out of state, in order to prefer local
production and business. Congress can replace or simply override laws
that discriminate in that fashion. Commercial laws of New York that
discriminate between Albany and Rochester, by contrast, are left to the
voters of New York.
Congress also has power over contracts at the back end, as it were,
power that once again illuminates the larger design. It can adopt uniform
rules of bankruptcy, and thereby coordinate the claims of creditors, who
may be from any state or another country, and enable discharges that
will be respected throughout the United States.16 Once again, this power
yields the benefits of uniformity—purchased with its costs—and bars
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
15. Article I provides that Congress has the power to regulate commerce with
foreign nations, among the states, and with the Indian tribes. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
3.
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
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some forms of state defection. States would be tempted to favor their
own, be they debtors or creditors, by granting bankruptcy relief generously
for debtors or refusing to recognize it against creditors. A state
with disproportionately many members of one group might adopt a
nondiscriminatory approach to bankruptcy that nevertheless is hostile to
outsiders.
Free economies need a stable currency in addition to rules of property
and contract. The Constitution authorizes Congress to supply one by
giving it the exclusive power to coin money and the preemptive power to
specify the dollar value of coin.17
As that last observation reminds us, the Constitution goes beyond
forming the states into a federal union and creating a general government
with certain specified powers.18 It also imposes explicit restrictions on
the states, restrictions in addition to those imposed by their own
constitutions.19 Some of those restrictions complement affirmative grants of
power to the national government by making those grants exclusive or
partly so. Only the President and Senate may enter into a commercial
treaty, not New Jersey alone, because states are forbidden from making
treaties.20 They may not intrude into that national sphere, just as they
may not confuse matters by coining their own money.21
Other restrictions on the states, however, are of the kind especially
familiar to constitutional practice today, and limit government power
rather than allocating it only to one level. States may not make anything
other than gold or silver coin a tender in payment of debts, nor may they
impair the obligation of contracts.22 They are thus sharply limited in
their ability to adopt debtor relief legislation. The ban on tender laws
attacks one well-known tool to that end, while the more general Contracts
Clause secures existing contractual obligations against legislative alteration.23
In doing so, the Contracts Clause adopts the Constitution’s characteristic
strategy of protecting nonconstitutional private rights without creating
them itself. The Constitution does not determine which contracts, if any,

17. Congress has power to coin money and regulate the value thereof and of
foreign coins, and the states are forbidden to coin money. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5;
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
19. U.S. CONST. art I, § 10.
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
21. See id.
22. Id.
23. The Constitution’s provisions concerning state legal tender laws and related
legislation are discussed in Craig v. Missouri, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 410, 417–18 (1830), and
the Contracts Clause is discussed in Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122,
123 (1819).
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have legal obligation.24 More generally, it does not prescribe a law of
contracts. Rather, it assumes that the states will have one, and blocks a
dangerous mode of changing it. It thus uses a nonconstitutional baseline,
here one located in time, in order to secure economic liberty without
directly legislating on the topic.
Through selective grants of power to Congress, and limitations on the
states that still leave them with very broad discretion as to the content of
private rights, the Constitution was set up to promote a free and
successful national economy while saying hardly anything about the
content of the legal infrastructure that would support it.
Congress is not the only branch of the national government, and its
powers are not the entire story of that government’s role in supporting a
free economy. Even the best rules of property and contract will produce
disputes, so the quality and impartiality of dispute resolution is important to
economic liberty. Article III, which sets out the jurisdiction of the federal
courts, can in large measure be justified on the grounds that it too fosters
economic liberty.25 Much of the Article III jurisdiction is implicitly
about trade. The admiralty jurisdiction overwhelmingly is so, and diversity
jurisdiction applies to disputes between citizens of different states, or
between Americans and foreigners, that are very likely to arise from
interstate and international business dealings.26 Such cases would tempt
state courts to misbehave, favoring their own against outsiders, and
thereby threatening either the harmony of the Union or its relations with
foreign countries.
Here too the Constitution’s approach is more modest than it could be.
One way to deal with such bias would be to take the substance of the law
out of the hands of the states, by restricting them or empowering
Congress or even directly adopting the substance of the law in the
Constitution. Instead, the drafters of Article III took for granted a
24. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 215 (1827) (finding that state law, not the
Constitution, creates the obligation that contracts may not be impaired).
25. See U.S. CONST. art. III.
26. Article III extends the judicial power of the United States to “all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; . . . to all Cases of admiralty and
maritime Jurisdiction; . . . to Controversies . . . between Citizens of different States . . .
and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects.”
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. The particular treaty that the Framers most had in mind
with the treaty-based jurisdiction, the Treaty of Peace with Great Britain, was important
mainly because of its clause protecting the rights of British creditors in the United States.
Definitive Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. IV, Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80.
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relatively benign lawmaking process, and dealt with possible bias in
adjudication by providing unbiased adjudicators.27 They provided for
the creation of federal courts staffed with life-tenured judges selected by
the national government—and with no participation by the only directly
elected part thereof, the House of Representatives.28 Article III enables
Congress to give those courts extensive jurisdiction over cases implicating
economic transactions, but the grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts
did not entail a grant of law-making power either to those courts or to
Congress.
II. SUBSTANTIVE PROTECTION OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND THE
PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
As I have described it, the Constitution’s protection of economic
liberty is real, but in an important sense, indirect. Not only does the
Federal Constitution not itself contain the fundamental rules of property
and contract that are the foundation of economic activity and interaction,
it allows the states enormous leeway in deciding what their rules on
those topics shall be. And while it gives Congress only limited powers
in this area and others, it leaves the national legislature with very broad
policy discretion in the exercise of those powers.
My description of the Constitution, and the justification I have
suggested, involves very little of what most people today would think of
as constitutional protection: affirmative restrictions in favor of the
interest being served—here private property and free markets. That
omission reflects the fact that the extent to which the Constitution
contains such limitations is a matter of controversy, and so a description
of well-accepted aspects of the system cannot assume their existence.
Here I will advance the interpretive claim that in fact the Constitution
contains very little by way of restrictions on government in favor of
economic rights. In particular, I believe that neither Congress nor the
states are subject to a general requirement that their laws governing
economic rights and activity, or any of their other laws, be reasonable.
States may severely limit freedom of contract and choose the extent to
which property shall be held privately or by the government itself.
Congress may exercise its regulatory powers, for example, over interstate
business transactions, in a way that gravely restricts those transactions.
Students of Professor Siegan’s work will recognize that here I part
company with him, and with Professor Richard Epstein, another contributor
to this symposium and the foremost exponent today of the position that
27.
28.
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he shares with Professor Siegan and that I do not.29 Professor Siegan
believed in particular that Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment
imposes strong limits on the discretion of the states with respect to rights
of property and contract. Of Section One’s components, the most plausible
vehicle for the imposition of such limits is the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, as it is the part that refers most directly to rights of property and
contract. Those rights were routinely referred to as privileges and
immunities of citizens in the nineteenth century, and are protected from
discrimination by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.30
As David Currie explained, the Privileges or Immunities Clause was
originally understood to perform the function now attributed to the Equal
Protection Clause.31 By requiring that every state accord all of its
citizens the same civil rights, it was thought to forbid discriminatory
legislation like the southern Black Codes and to write into the
Constitution the anti-discrimination rule of the Civil Rights Act of
1866.32 If that is correct, the Fourteenth Amendment follows the now
familiar strategy of identifying a nonconstitutional baseline of private
rights. Indeed, its Privileges or Immunities Clause closely resembles
Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause. Both extend to a less favored
group the civil rights that the nonconstitutional law accords to a more
favored group. Article IV gives Americans from other states the rights
of state citizens.33 The Fourteenth Amendment gives citizens who have
been discriminated against, paradigmatically blacks and freed slaves, the
rights of those who are not discriminated against because they make the
laws, paradigmatically free white citizens.34 Neither provision requires
that the Constitution itself say what those civil rights are, yet each
protects them, and the economic liberty they provide.

29. Professor Siegan’s views were set out most fully in BERNARD H. SIEGAN, THE
SUPREME COURT’S CONSTITUTION (1987). Those of Professor Epstein are found in many
works, most notably RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER
OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
30. A classic discussion by Justice Washington on circuit of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, and the legal advantages it protects, is found in Corfield v. Coryell, 6
Fed. Cas. 546, 549 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
31. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST
HUNDRED YEARS 1789–1888, at 347–51 (1985); see also John Harrison, Reconstructing
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1387 (1992).
32. Harrison, supra note 31, at 1402–04, 1414–24.
33. U.S. CONST. art. IV.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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It is thus true that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects
economic liberty, and indeed rights of property and contract. Those are
indeed the stuff of citizenship. But it does not do so the way the First
Amendment protects the freedom of speech.35 It does so in a way consistent
with both federalism and the capacity of nonconstitutional decisionmakers
to change legal rules to adjust to changing circumstances.
Professor Siegan did not share this view of the Fourteenth Amendment.36
He believed not only that it protects rights of property and contract, but
that it goes beyond equality and substantively constrains state law. It
seems likely to me that he reached that conclusion by combining a
widely shared but erroneous premise with a correct premise. The widely
shared but erroneous assumption, adopted by the Supreme Court in the
Slaughter-House Cases, is that the provision is substantive like the First
Amendment.37 The correct assumption is that the privileges and immunities
that it shields include economic rights. Put those two together and you
have a plausible but incorrect interpretation.
Despite that argument’s appeal, it is unlikely that the Clause has a
substantive aspect insofar as it relates to economic rights in general.38
The Clause forbids the states from abridging the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States. The most common textual route to a
substantive reading is to argue that whatever else it does, the Clause
protects rights of distinctively national citizenship, as even Slaughter
House agrees.39 Next comes the more adventurous move: to say that
United States citizenship brings with it the most basic rights, including,
for example, the right to earn a living.
But it does not, because of American federalism and the related
principle of enumerated federal power. As I have emphasized, the
Constitution left basic questions of property and contract, and indeed
bodily integrity and self ownership, to the states and their law.40 The
35. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
36. For example, Professor Siegan endorsed the level of protection of contract
rights associated with Lochner. SIEGAN, supra note 1, at 81.
37. The Court in the Slaughter-House Cases found that the Clause provides
substantive protection, but only to the rights of distinctively national citizenship.
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74 (1873). An example of a substantive
reading of the Clause in which its protections are not so limited is John C. Eastman, Reevaluating the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 123 (2003).
38. By putting it that way, I mean to exclude the question of incorporation of the
Federal Bill of Rights against the states; the first eight Amendments do deal with
property rights, but that is not what I am concerned with here.
39. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 74 (1873).
40. It may seem that I am arguing in a circle and that the question is whether the
Fourteenth Amendment makes rights of property and contract into rights of national
citizenship. There is an argument, but no circle. In fuller form, my reasoning is as
follows: Absent the Fourteenth Amendment, the Constitution allocates to the national
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most striking sign of this is the limited grant of powers to Congress, a
grant that does not include, for example, authority to adopt a national
law about the acquisition and transfer of real estate. In a system of
federalism like this one, rights of national citizenship are those that are
either granted by the national constitution or about which the national
legislature may legislate. Patents and copyrights are associated with
national citizenship, but real estate is not.
As the example of intellectual property points out, to say that basic
economic rights come with national and not state citizenship would
imply that the states may not legislate about them at all, not that state
legislation is somehow limited. Patent holders have the rights that
Congress gives them, no matter what state law may provide.41 If the
Fourteenth Amendment somehow transforms all property rights into
accompaniments of national citizenship, then it strips the states of any
control over them. This point is the flip side of Justice Field’s argument
in Slaughter House that the protection of distinctively national rights
could not have been the point of the Amendment, because the Supremacy
Clause already accomplishes that goal; Field was right about that.42 It
does not, however, empower Congress to supply the missing legal
content. Section Five authorizes the national legislature to enforce the
prohibition on the states; it does not provide for the creation of a national
code of private law, nor does the Constitution do so elsewhere.
Americans have two citizenships, as the Fourteenth Amendment itself
recognizes.43 The allocation of individual rights between those two
citizenships reflects the allocation of legislative authority between the
two levels of government. When Justice Miller, to the amusement of

government very little power concerning basic civil rights, and so leaves the vast bulk of
that power with the states. In referring to privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States, the Privileges or Immunities Clause does not purport to create any new
rights; it points to those that otherwise exist. It has no language conferring or defining
rights and refers to a body of legal advantages that exist without it.
41. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
42. Justice Field argued that if the Privileges or Immunities Clause was limited to
protecting rights of distinctively national citizenship, it was pointless because state
interference with such rights already was forbidden by the Supremacy Clause of Article
VI. “With privileges and immunities thus designated or implied [by national citizenship]
no State could ever have interfered by its laws, and no new constitutional provision was
required to inhibit such interference. The supremacy of the Constitution and the laws of
the United States always controlled any State legislation of that character.” SlaughterHouse Cases, 83 U.S. at 96.
43. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

721

HARRISON.FINAL.DOC

10/14/2008 10:44:41 AM

subsequent readers, listed access to the navigable waters of the United
States as a privilege of national citizenship in Slaughter House, he was
not seeking to mock the plaintiffs’ argument or give them cold comfort.44
He was giving an example of a subject matter governed by national
legislative power—maritime commerce—private rights as to which were
therefore likewise national. More broadly speaking, Miller’s list reflects
his understanding of the allocation of sovereignty between the states and
the United States. National citizenship and national sovereignty go together,
as state citizenship and state sovereignty go together.
Faced with the Constitution’s allocation of most private rights to state
authority, proponents of the claim that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause imposes substantive constraints on the state law of private rights
may adopt a different approach, one that begins by agreeing that property
rights are mainly matters for state law, state sovereignty, and state
citizenship. The next step then would be to say that the national Constitution,
to some extent, determines the legal rights that come with state citizenship,
while not associating those rights with national citizenship. Although
that might seem a strange way of going about things, it is not simply
inconceivable. The Constitution takes steps to ensure that state legislatures
will remain republican without thereby turning them into Congress.45
Although the Constitution could do that, the text of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause does not. Its structure is parallel to similar provisions
that deal with abridgements by the states of rights under state law,
including the provisions about voting like the Nineteenth Amendment.46
It refers to a body of legal advantages found in state law, the privileges
and immunities of (state) citizenship and directs that the states not
abridge them. The Nineteenth Amendment forbids the states from
abridging the right of citizens of the United States to vote on account of
sex.47 One important feature of the Constitution is that it does not
prescribe the qualifications of voters generally, and in particular, does
not prescribe the qualification of voters for state office. Rather, it takes
those qualifications so much for granted that it uses them as the measure
of voting in federal elections: voters for the House, and now for the
Senate, are those who are qualified to vote for the most numerous branch

44. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 79.
45. The Guarantee Clause charges the United States with ensuring that every state
has a republican form of government, but does not do so by consolidating the states into
the Republic that the Constitution creates. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
46. The Nineteenth Amendment forbids states and the United States from abridging
citizens’ right to vote on the basis of sex, but it does not purport to confer the right to
vote. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
47. Id.
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of the state legislature.48 If the Constitution dictated the content of the
right to vote for state legislatures, it would not proceed in so roundabout
a fashion. The Nineteenth Amendment thus takes for granted that there
is a body of state law about voter qualifications, a body of law that gives
rise to something called the right to vote.49 It does not confer on anyone
the right to vote; state law does that. The Nineteenth Amendment does
constrain state law in one respect, providing that the right to vote as
defined thereby may not be denied to U.S. citizens on account of sex.
Under the equality-based reading, the Privileges or Immunities Clause
takes just this approach. The Federal Constitution refers to, but does not
determine the content of, rights under state law. If the Clause were
designed to tell the states the content of their law, a very serious step in a
federal system, it would be formulated more affirmatively. It might say,
for example, each state shall secure the right to contract. But in keeping
with basic assumptions about the role of the states and the nation,
including the national Constitution, it does not do so.
III. THE DECLINE OF LIMITED FEDERAL POWER TO REGULATE
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
So far my discussion of the Constitution has had two features. First, it
has been mainly descriptive—in Section II, argumentatively so as the
description I urge is not universally agreed with. I have discussed how
the Constitution pursues a particular goal, not how well it does so, and
so have been descriptive rather than evaluative. Second, this description
has been of the system one can read from the text with some historical
context, not of the system that is actually in place.
Those questions, about efficacy and change over time, are related to
one another. On the question of evaluation, a symposium dedicated to
the legacy of Professor Siegan naturally invites the question: would a
constitution better pursue its goal—in particular, the goal of protecting
economic liberty—more directly? Would it be better for the Constitution
simply to dictate basic rules about property, contract, and economic
interactions, with perhaps a little bit of flexibility, than to pursue the
highly indirect strategy I have attributed to the text?
48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (discussing the qualifications for electors for
House); U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 1 (discussing the qualifications for electors for
Senate).
49. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
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Probably not, I think. Constitutions are, by design, strongly entrenched;
they are quite hard to change, and are supposed to be hard to change. In
this country, the courts play a large role in enforcing the Constitution,
which means that they give content to constitutional standards.
Sometimes they even give content to constitutional rules, but I think, and
hope, that happens less often.
Combine those facts and you have a dilemma for any policy of
constitutionalization. Rules are relatively clear in their application, but
they purchase their clarity by a rigidity that has serious drawbacks.
Rules interact with the world to produce results. They must therefore be
based on assumptions about how the world will respond, and the less
flexible the rule, the more it depends on the accuracy of those assumptions.
If the world changes, the rule may produce unintended results. The
Constitution’s designers were prepared to tolerate some deviation from
the political equality of citizens in the interest of state sovereignty. The
compromise in the voting rules for the House and Senate demonstrates
this.50 But today we have a much greater deviation: California has the
same number of Senators as Wyoming, and more than seventy times the
population.51 As times change, inflexible rules are likely to produce
results at odds with the purposes they serve.
One natural solution to the need for flexibility is to replace rules with
standards. Instead of adopting the law of contract as it stood in 1787, the
Constitution could have said something more general but still designed
substantially to constrain subordinate lawmakers. Standards are delegations
to future lawmakers and, with respect to the Constitution, the future
lawmakers are frequently the courts.52 To the extent that it constitutionalized
the law of contract, for example, the Constitution would have been
giving the courts the power to make the law of contract, subject to little
or no revision by the legislature.
Delegating power in that fashion would not, of course, eliminate
political controversies over the content of the law of contract. It would
only displace them from legislatures to courts, and therefore increase the
importance of policy considerations in the selection of judges. Anyone
who thinks it would be a good idea for the Supreme Court of the United

50. Representation in the House of Representatives is based on population, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (now modified by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2), while each
state has two Senators, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
51. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 2008, at 17 (noting that California’s population in 2006 was
approximately 36,458,000; Wyoming’s was approximately 515,000).
52. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 139–41 (William N. Eskridge &
Phillip Frickey eds., 1994) (discussing the difference between rules and standards).
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States to be the legislature for the private law of this country, and hence,
for example, the legislature for the law of medical malpractice, should
think about what Supreme Court confirmations would be like if that
were true. Hot button social issues are one thing; multibillion-dollar
distributional struggles are another.
As I indicated, the preceding observation is related to the point that the
Constitution one reads is not the Constitution we have. Most important
among the changes is that the national legislature, at least when it comes
to economic questions, is not one of enumerated powers. It has general
authority to regulate the economy, and to redistribute the economy’s
fruits through taxation and expenditure.
That there should have been so much change may or may not be good,
but it should not be surprising. The enumeration of the powers of the
national government is the most substantive part of the Constitution.
Most of the rest is about the selection and tenure of officials, the
relations between different branches of government, and so forth. The
enumerated powers are also fairly rule-like, identifying pretty specific
matters as to which Congress may legislate, like intellectual property
and post offices.
Imperfectly, that list of powers implements a theory of what should be
decided centrally in an extended republic, as of 1787. I say imperfectly,
because the list is somewhat haphazard, derived in part from historical
accidents as much as anything. That is not to say that it is just a
hodgepodge, but it is to say that it reflected only limited thinking about
the basic problem. The Federal Convention looked at the problems that
had arisen under the Articles, mainly national insolvency, national military
weakness, and conflicts among the states about trade policy—internal
and external—and came up with powers aimed at those specific problems.53
That is usually how constitutions are made.
Then over the decades, lots of things changed, and lots of people came
to believe that the old list did not make as much sense as it once had.
What happens in a democracy when large and stable majorities decide
that they do not like the provisions of the Constitution? If they have the
time and are willing to make the effort, they will change the Constitution’s
text. But our Constitution presents a tempting alternative. Formal
53. Rakove discusses the deficiencies of the Articles that gave rise to the Federal
Convention. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION 23–34 (1996). The Framers’ response with respect to the powers of
the new government are found primarily in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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amendments are difficult because of the required super majorities at the
state level.54 It can be a lot easier to cut out the states as such, and simplify
the process, by operating entirely inside the national government. Stable
majorities in Congress and the presidency can adopt legislation that
seems desirable and appoint judges who will approve it.
The process by which the country has come to the current principles
governing federal power, however, has serious weaknesses. Because
that process has operated through the adoption and judicial endorsement
of statutes creating new federal programs, and not through the adoption
of a constitutional amendment that would codify new views concerning
the desirable role of the federal government, particular questions of
policy have been bound up with the more general question of the
allocation of authority among levels of government. It is entirely
possible that if Congress deliberated on a constitutional amendment that
would bring federalism into the twenty-first century, it would produce a
text more restrictive than the current de facto Constitution. Certainly
such an amendment would authorize social security, but it might well
give the states more autonomy with respect to environmental policy.
There is reason to believe, then, that the Framers’ judgment about the
proper malleability of the Constitution was wrong, or is no longer
correct, at least with respect to the allocation of power between the states
and the national government, which is the aspect of the Constitution that
bears most directly on economic liberty. Precisely because the most
desirable higher order rules on that subject change with changes in the
economy, the extremely strong entrenchment that the Constitution
provides leads not to inflexibility, but to flexibility that operates through
the ordinary legislative process and the process of appointing judges and
Justices. That is undesirable.
Quite possibly the best constitutional arrangement would provide for
multiple levels of entrenchment, with some rules that are highly resistant
to change and others, probably including those governing the allocation
of power between the levels of government, that are substantially sticky
but not as much as Article V makes the Constitution.55 That way, each
generation could adapt the Constitution to its own needs with rules that
would be stable for decades but change over the centuries, and could do
so through explicit acts of popular sovereignty, not dodgy mechanisms
54. Constitutional amendments must be ratified by three-fourths of the states. U.S.
CONST. art. V. As Keith Whittington points out, President Franklin Roosevelt was well
aware of both the ease with which state level minorities could block constitutional
amendments and the power of changes in judicial attitudes to change constitutional
doctrine. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 47–
48, 63–64 (2006).
55. U.S. CONST. art. V.
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involving judicial validation of doubtful statutes. The Earth belongs to
the living, and so does the Constitution.
That document as I have described it, an essentially structural instrument
that regulates a ramified legal and governmental system that it largely
takes for granted, could be called Henry Hart’s Constitution. In addition,
some of it, I think, and one important aspect of it, I know, can be described
as David Currie’s Constitution. Appeals to authority are common in
law, and often appropriate, and I will without hesitation appeal to the
late Professor Currie’s authority. John Heminge and Henry Condell,
editors of the First Folio of Shakespeare’s plays, gave advice that also
applies with respect to Currie: “Read him, therefore; and again, and
again.”56 Because David Currie, like Henry Hart, was—almost—always
right.

56. THE NORTON FACSIMILE OF THE FIRST FOLIO OF SHAKESPEARE 7 (2d ed. 1996)
(spelling modernized).
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